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Battle of Grenada

warrior, 21 Дек 2013

Battle of Grenada

The French had won the battle; the initiative lay with d’Estaing. As the two fleets sailed toward the northeast, Byron feared that the longer French line might double his own or that d’Estaing might detach his frigates and send them after the British convoy. From his flagship, d’Estaing surveyed the situation and at 1545 signaled for his fleet to tack and to sail back toward St. George’s Bay. Three British ships of the line, heavily damaged earlier in the day, lay directly in the path of the French fleet, but, to the astonishment of many in both commands, d’Estaing’s men-of-war sailed by, content to exchange a few desultory broadsides before returning to the bay without having taken as much as a prize.

Battle of Grenada

Grenada is of interest in part because Byron departed the line, lost the battle, and suffered neither execution nor court-martial: so much for any stultifying effect. Byron, believing he had caught an inferior and disordered fleet at anchor, promptly attacked. He failed because of inaccurate intelligence and an unusually quick French reaction. The British, despite their positional and numerical disadvantage, performed fairly well. They suffered about six hundred casualties; the French nearly a thousand. And although Byron had thrown out Howe’s signal book and resurrected the old fighting instructions, the divisions and ships of the fleet cooperated better than had Keppel’s at Ushant, or would Howe’s at the Glorious First of June in 1794. At a critical stage of the battle of Grenada, as Byron’s fleet wore (brought its stern across the direction of the wind) and reversed course as it tried to re-form, a gap opened between Barrington’s van and the center. Rear Admiral Joshua Rowley, commanding the liners with the convoy, “saw Barrington’s three ships unduly separated and doubtless visibly mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly following his leader, he cut straight across to the head of the column to support the van,—an act almost absolutely identical with that which won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was followed by the Monmouth, 64, [from Rear Admiral Hyde Parker’s rear division] the brilliancy of whose bearing was so conspicuous to the two fleets that it is said that French officers after the battle toasted ‘the little black ship.’”

One could portray d’Estaing’s inability to make the most of the victory to his refusal to depart the line ahead. But the factors that constrained d’Estaing were not to be found in the realm of French tactics, but in that of operations and strategy. French admirals sought not victory over their opponent’s fleet in a quest for control or command of the seas, but support for a successful operation ashore. D’Estaing’s problem was not an overly strict adherence to the line, but his unwillingness to risk the sole prize he had to show for his efforts in American waters—Grenada.

Рубрика: → History

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